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Helms Burton: A View From Abroad
Runa Kinzel*
Part 1-Introduction
On March 12, 1996, the United States legislature passed the
highly controversial Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, also known by the names of its initiators,
Jesse Helms and Dan Burton, as the Helms-Burton Act.' The HelmsBurton Act has often been criticised for its non-conformity with
international law. This note will examine the legal issues surrounding the
controversy, present the European Union position on the Act and its
conflict with international law, and critique the American stance toward
the Act's formulation and implementation.
The History of the Helms-Burton Act
The Helms-Burton Act, or Libertad, was but another step in a
history of almost forty years of the United States' foreign policy to
promote the downfall of the Castro government and to support the
transition to a democratically elected government in Cuba.2 The United
States' interest in Cuban affairs dates back to the late 19 d'century when,
following the explosion of the U.S. "Maine" in Havana in 1898, the U.S.
stepped in to assist Cuba against Spain, of which Cuba was then a
colony.
The Spanish-American War of 1898 resulted in a defeat of the
Spanish colonial power and the handing over of Cuba to the U.S. 3 In
1902, Cuba formally became an independent state, but remained de facto
dependent on the U.S. due to its almost exclusive trade-relations with the
United States. In 1959, Fidel Castro took power in Cuba, supported
initially by the U.S.. But with an official denomination of Castro's
government to a Marxist-Leninist-oriented policy, relations between
Cuba and the U.S. worsened significantly. From 1959 until 1960, all
land-owners in Cuba were expropriated. With respect to expropriated
United Sates nationals, compensation still remains to be paid. Relations
continued to worsen because of the threat of Russian nuclear weapons
* (J.D.) University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany.
'Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (Mar. 12, 1996) [hereinafter Act].
2Meng, EuZW 1997,423.
3See the Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, T.S. No. 343.
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which were temporarily stationed on Cuban territory, and which caused
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Since 1962, the U.S.' reaction to
Cuban policy has been one of political isolation and economic embargo,
a policy reflected in U.S. legislation. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
was passed, followed by the downing of two American civil aircraft in
March 1996 led to the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act, despite a former resentment by President Clinton.4
Title 1-Strengthening International Sanctions Against the Castro
Government
Title 1 includes further enforcement of the economic embargo
against Cuba,5 additional penalties under the Trading with the Enemy
Act, 6 the denial of visas to certain Cuban nationals, 7 a prohibition against
indirect financing of Cuba8 and an expression of the United States
opposition to Cuban membership in international financial institutions 9
as well as a condemnation of the Cuban attack on American aircraft. 10
Title 2-Assistance to a Free and Independent Cuba
This Title describes the kind of assistance the U.S.A will render
when a transition or democratically elected government has been
established in Cuba, including economic support, coordination of
assistance programs and the termination of the economic embargo
against Cuba." The factors and requirements for determining a2
transitional or democratically elected government are also set forth.1
Section 207 handles the settlement of outstanding United States claims to
confiscated property in Cuba. A satisfactory resolution of those claims
by a Cuban Government recognised by the United States remains an
essential 3condition to rebuilding normal economic and diplomatic
relations.1

4 Compare Nissen,

RIW 1999; 350, 352.
Act § 102 (a) (1), (a) (2).
6 Act § 102 (d)(1).
7 Act § 102 (e).
8 Act § 103.
9 Act § 104.
'0 Act § 115.
" Act § 201-204.
t2 Act § 205-206.
13 Act § 207 (b).
5
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Title 3-Protection of Property Rights of United States Nationals
Under Title 3, liability is established for any person's trafficking
in confiscated property claimed by U.S. nationals in order to provide the
latter with a judicial remedy.14
Thus, Title 3 enables U.S. nationals who own a claim to property which
was confiscated by the Cuban government on or after Jan. 1, 1959 to sue
any person trafficking in that property for money damages up to the sum
of three times the amount of the fair market value of the property plus
interest, court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.15
Furthermore, the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine is
announced 6 and certain7 procedural requirements for claims of U.S.
nationals are described.'
Section 306 (b) grants the President suspension authority for a
period of not more than six months. Under this section, the President
may postpone the effective date of Title 3 if it is necessary to the national
interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy
in Cuba. This authority was used continuously every six months during
the Clinton Administration and was exercised by President Bush on
January 16, 2001.8
Title 4-Exclusion of Certain Aliens
Title 4 contains an exclusion clause, which excludes from the
United States those aliens who have or traffic in the confiscated property
of U.S. nationals, 19 a right to the secretary of state to grant exemption
from exclusion for medical reasons or for litigation under Title 3, and
definitions of "confiscated" and "traffics." Of particular importance in
the liability provision of Title 3 is the definition of trafficking, as it is
extremely broad. For example, it provides that "...entering into a
commercial arrangement using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property..." as well as "...causing, directing, participating in or profiting
from..." are included in the definition of trafficking, as is transferring,
trading, purchasing, selling and improving the confiscated property.20
14 Act § 302.
15 id.

'6Act § 302 (a) (6).
17 Act § 302(c).
18 U.S. Department of State, Libertad Act
<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/2596.htm>.
'9 Act § 401.
20 Act § 401 (b) (2).

(May

1,

2001)

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

VOL. 10

Secondary Boycott
Another aspect arises with a closer look at the combination of the
provisions of Title 3 and 4 of the Act. Title 3 liability serves not only to
compensate U.S. nationals, but also serves the purpose of imposing
severe sanctions upon Cuba. 21 The threat of liability within the United
States with damages up to three times the value of the confiscated
property combined with exclusion from U.S. territory would be of
serious detriment to businesses worldwide. The United States' economic
market is one of the largest and most significant in the global economy;
the decision between trading within it, or trading with Cuba and being
denied access to the U.S. market would be rather an easy one for a
business enterprise concerned with its own viability.22 Thus, non-U.S.
based business enterprises are indirectly forced to choose between
trading with the United States or Cuba, which constitutes a so-called
secondary boycott.2 The legality of this effect will also be reviewed.
Part2-Reaction to the Helms-Burton Act: Europe's Position
General Reaction
Prior to the passing of the Helms-Burton Act, a wave of
international protest had already begun to form against the United States,
with the major premise that the U.S. was unlawfully exercising its
jurisdiction extraterritorially.
When the Act entered into force in March 1996, diplomatic
measures turned into defensive action. Canada and the United Kingdom,
for instance, reactivated their blocking statutes and Mexico passed one.24
In November 1996, the General Assembly of the United Nations
demanded that the United States eliminate the infringement of
sovereignty that the Act imposed on other States.
Amongst the protestors was the European Union. On the
diplomatic level, the EU consistently expressed its opposition both as a
matter of law and as a matter of policy to the extraterritorial applications
I.

As it is stated in the Act itself in § 3 (2).
22 Compare Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 419,429-430 (1996).
21

23 Id.

24See,

e.g., Foreign ExtraterritorialMeasures Act (as amended by Bill C-54
passed by the House of Commons on 9 October, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 117 (1997).
2 G.A. Res. 51/17, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/51/17 (1996).
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of U.S. jurisdiction with respect to its restriction of EU trade in goods
and services with Cuba.26
WTO Complaint
After the exchange of diplomatic notes and the passing of the
Act and no solution to the dispute, the EU applied to the WTO for the
introduction of a dispute settlement procedure according to Article 23 of
GATT. Then, following fruitless consultations between the EU and the
United States during the summer of 1996, the EU requested the
establishment of a dispute settlement panel on Sept. 30'h 1996. Despite
initial resentment by the U.S.A, the panel was put into place by the
Dispute Settlement Body by the end of that year.2 7 But instead of
delivering what would have been an enlightening panel report, the parties
reached an agreement. On April 11t ', 1997, the Understanding on U.S.
Extraterritorial Legislation between the EU and the United States was
proclaimed.
Within the Agreement, the two parties fostered their intention to
develop disciplines and principles before Oct 15, h 1997, concerning the
dispute in bilateral consultations.28
The EU sought a continued suspension of the liability provision of Title
3 as well as an amendment by Congress of Title 4, leading to a
Presidential waiver. As of the date of this article, that waiver has not
been provided, but the exclusion clause has not been applied to EU
citizens and firms since the Agreement was reached.
The Agreement ended the dispute settlement procedure but the
EU reserved all rights to resume the panel procedure or to begin a new
one, if action is taken against EU companies or individuals under Titles
III or IV of the Helms-Burton Act.29

II.

European Union: Demarches ProtestingThe Cuban Liberty and Democratic
t
1995] 35 I.L.M.
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act [March 5, 1996 and March 131,
397, 397-400 (1996).
27 Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) Protecting Against the Effects of the
Application of Certain Legislation of Certain Third Countries, and Actions
Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.1. (C 296), available at
http://Www.europa.eu.int.
28 Understanding Between the European Union and the United States on US
Legislation (April 11, 1997) at http://wvwv.europa.eu.int.
Extraterritorial
29
26

id.
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European Legislative Action
On November 22, 1996, the EU passed Council Regulation (EC)
NO. 2271/96 (hereafter Regulation), which protects its citizens against
the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a
third country3 " 31based on jurisdiction granted by Articles 133 and 308 of
the EC Treaty.
The Regulation was aimed at blocking recognition and
enforcement of the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act, which is laid out in Titles 1, 3 and 4 of the Annex. Article 5 contains
a prohibition of compliance with foreign orders resulting from the two
Acts, whereas an exception is granted when non-compliance could result
in serious damage to a natural or legal person. Article 6 offers a basis for
a counter-claim to recover damages caused by the application of the two
laws against those persons. 2
But since the Regulation only serves to protect natural and legal
persons in the European Community, the potential legal wrongs
committed by the U.S.A against citizens of other countries in applying
the Helms-Burton Act are yet to be corrected. Therefore, the legality of
the Act must still be scrutinized.
Part 3-Helms-Burton in International Law
Violations of International Treaties

I.

A. The Helms-Burton Act and GATT/GATS
First, the Helms-Burton Act violates a number of provisions of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and therefore stands in
contravention to the World Trade Organization (WTO). A counterargument to this is often advanced in that a violation of any GAT or
GATS provisions is not an issue because trade with stolen goods does
not fall within the scope of GAT and GATS. 33 However, it is wellCouncil Regulation (EC) Protecting Against the Effects of the Application of
Certain Legislation of Certain Third Countries, and Actions Based Thereon or
Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309)
Resulting
31
30

id.

Council Regulation, supra note 30.
Compare Brice M. Clagett, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act Continued,A Reply to ProfessorLowenfeld, 90 Am.
J. Int'l L. 641, 641-642 (1996).
32

33

Fall 2002

HELMS BURTON: VIEW

recognized that States have the right to expropriate land.3 4 Here, the only
missing piece is the payment of adequate compensation, and the fact that
Cuba entered into compensation treaties with Canada and the United
Kingdom does not foster the assumption that the Cuban government is
to pay it. These circumstances are therefore not comparable to
unwilling
35
theft.
i. Most Favoured Nation Principle-Art. I GATT and Art. II GATS
The Most-Favoured Nation principle, which is laid down in both
Article 1 of the GATT in respect to the trade of products (goods) and in
Article 2 of the GATS regarding the trade of services, states that any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product or service originating in or destined for another
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product or service from or for the territories of all other contracting
parties.36
In the case of the Helms-Burton Act, section 302 imposes
liability-among other things-for trading with Cuban products
originating from "confiscated" property and investing in such property.
Traders or investors doing business in the United States have to face that
liability as well as the danger of exclusion under section 401. Thus, they
and their products and services are treated differently by the U.S. from
the ones without "a trace of connection" to Cuba, who therefore have a
competitive business advantage. This difference in treatment is a clear
violation of the most-favoured nation principle laid out in GATT and
GATS.
ii. National Treatment Provision-Article 3 GATT and Article 17
GATS
Following this provision, the United States is required to treat
equally all goods and services of the contracting parties and of their own
nationals. Title 3 of the Helms-Burton Act includes non-U.S. nationals in
the already existing embargo prohibiting almost all trade between U.S.
nationals and Cuba. Viewed from that perspective, Title 3 rather
produces equality in the sense of treating non-nationals like nationals.
34 Dolzer,

3.
35

Eigentum, Enteignung und Entsch5digung im geltenden V61kerrecht,

Nissen, supra note 4, at 353.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] art. I, sub. 1 and art. II
subsec. 1 GATS.
36
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A violation of Article 3 of the GATT and Article 17 of the
GATS by Title 3 of the Helms-Burton Act is to be denied.
iii. Freedom of Transit-Article 5 of the GATT
Article 5, subsection 2 of the GATT obliges the United States to
guarantee free transit of goods and persons through their territory for the
trades people of the contracting parties. The exclusion clause of section
401 of the Helms-Burton Act has been used against a trader from one of
the contracting parties, thus infringing the right of free transit, and with it
GATT's Article 5.37
iv. Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions-Article 11 of the GATT
Following Article 11, subsection 1 of GATT, no prohibition or
restriction other than duties or taxes (in other words, tariffs) shall be
instituted or maintained by any contracting party concerning the import,
export and sale of products of/from or in any territory of one of the
contracting parties.
The United States has imposed an embargo on Cuba and with the
Helms-Burton Act-as established above-is indirectly including all
their business partners through the secondary boycott. Embargoes are
prohibiting the trade with the isolated country altogether, which is why
they do not qualify as tariffs, but as non-tariff trade-restrictions. Cuba,
the EU Member States as well as the EU are members to the GATT
Agreement. Thus, the embargo on Cuban products constitutes an
infringement of Article 11.3'
B. Relevance of the Security Exception of Article 21 GATT and
Article 14 GATS
The United States' measures, which as argued above are
violating GATT and GATS provisions in a topical way, could be
justified under the security exceptions of Article 21(B) (iii) GATT and
Article 14 GATS. The United States invoked that exception clause by
passing the Helms-Burton Act, which states that the purpose of the Act is
"to provide for the continued national security of the United States in the
face of the continued threats from the Castro government of terrorism,
theft of property from United States nationals..." 39 The security exception
permits a diversion from all GATT provisions (and respectively, all
GATS provisions) in time of war or other emergency in international
CompareNissen, supra note 4, at 354.
Meng, supranote 2, at 427.
39
Act § 3 (3).

37

38
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relations,40 when the State considers it necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests. The controversy surrounding this exception
stems from how much discretion States have to determine what is
"necessary", because the wording of the exception leaves it to their
consideration.41
But, however broad that discretion is interpreted, it is only open
when the requirements of Article 21 are present: a war or other
emergency in international relations. 42 The United States is not currently
engaged in a war with any of the contracting parties, so only an
emergency could qualify. Again the wording of the security exception
clause provides some guidance, since it is "...war or other emergency..."
the causing emergency must have a significance coming somewhere
close to the one of a war.
One possible argument for an emergency situation is that the
Cuban expropriations were not executed in accordance with international
law, and thus constitutes an emergency for those U.S. nationals who have
had their property removed by the Cuban government. However, this
argument is weakened by two points. First, this situation has existed for
almost forty years and therefore does not likely constitute such an
emergency. Second, compensation may easily be secured through
negotiations with the Castro government; thus, alternative means for
resolving the dispute exist, another factor that suggests that this is not an
emergency. That the U.S. government currently refuses to negotiate with
the Castro government does not alter the conclusion.
Another argument posited for including the Helms-Burton Act
within GATT's security exception refers to the potential refugee waves
from Cuba once relations with Cuba are re-established is likewise not
persuasive. When Cuban markets are open to all foreign investors, the
economic situation will stabilise and generally improve, a factor that
normally works to discourage, rather than to encourage, emigration.
Refugee waves are thus not to be expected, in this case, cannot suffice as
justification for applying the security exception. This situation cannot be
qualified as an emergency justifying the suspension of all GATT
obligations, and especially not towards all third parties.

Compare HAHN, DIE EINSEITIGE AUSSETZUNG VON GATTVERPFLICHTUNGEN ALS REPRESSALIE 293.
41 Meng, supra note 2, at 428.
42 Hahn, supra note 40, at 293; Nissen, supra note 4, at 355; Meng, supra note
2, at 428.
40
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General Public International Law

A. Applicability of Public International Law
To apply any public international law norm as justification, the
governed circumstance must be a subject of public international law.
Doubts concerning the latter can only arise in connection with
the Title 3 provisions which provide a remedy for U.S. nationals, whose
property was confiscated by the Cuban State on or after Jan. 1 st, 1959.
The circle of favoured persons includes all United States nationals as
well as non-U.S. nationals and even Cubans who immigrated and became
U.S. nationals after the expropriation. Section 301 (10) of the HelmsBurton Act states that "the United States Government has an obligation
to its citizens to provide protection against wrongful confiscations by
foreign nations and their citizens." As for the Cuban 6migr~s, the
situation is somewhat unclear because at the time of the expropriation
they were Cuban citizens, thus they were expropriated by their own
government, which is why Cuban domestic law is to be applied not
international law.43
Where international claims are concerned, there are established
principles governing States' entitlement to make such claims. An injured
person must have the nationality of the claimant State at the time the
injury occurs and must retain it at least until the claim is presented,
which is clearly not the case here.44
Accordingly, the provision of Title 3 of the Helms-Burton Act
providing a claim for U.S. nationals, who were nationals of Cuba or
another country other than the United States at the time of expropriation,
infringes the sovereign right of that State to adjudicate it under
international or, as in the case of Cubans 6migr6s, its domestic law. This
constitutes a prohibited interference in internal affairs of another State
and is a breach of international law.
B. The Exercise of Jurisdiction
The application of Title 3 of the Act, which refers to actions
carried out by third country-nationals outside U.S. territory, also raises
jurisdictional questions. In international law, the notion of jurisdiction
refers to the power of States to govern persons, property and
circumstances and therefore includes judicial, legislative and

Compare Vaughan Lowe, U.S. ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: The HelmsBurton andD'Amato Acts, 46 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 1997, 378, 384.
43

44Id.

Fall 2002

HELMS BURTON: VIEW

administrative competence,45 also known as jurisdiction to prescribe,
jurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce.46 Despite the fact
that Title 3 of the Helms-Burton Act does not formally prohibit a certain
behaviour, but rather provides a private law liability claim, its practical
effect is prescriptive. The Act's express purpose is to serve the public
order enforcing and utilizes tools like the secondary boycott that work a
public prohibition. For these reasons, Titles 3 and 4 of the Helms-Burton
Act must be considered an exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe.47
i. Justification Under International Law
To constitute a lawful act under international law, Title 3 of the
Act has to be a justified exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
First, as for the exercise of jurisdiction, there is no positive rule
requiring States to exercise jurisdiction, but international law restricts a
recognised universal competence by prohibitive rules. 48 If there is no
such rule, the State ". . . . remains free to adopt the principles which it
regards as best and most suitable ....A9
Because all States are subject to international law, a somewhat
general freedom to exercise jurisdiction is to be applied within the limits
imposed by the basic principles of international law, like state
50
sovereignty, equality of States and non-interference in domestic affairs.
to jurisdiction is basically rooted in the principle
Thus, the competence
51
of territoriality.

45 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (Clarendon
Press 1990) (1966); REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAw: A
STUDENT INTRODUCTION 101 (Sweet & Maxwell 1986); MALCOLM N. SHAw,
LAW 452 (Cambridge Univ. Press 4 ed. 1997).
INTERNATIONAL
46

Doehring, V6lkerrecht, § 16 Rn. 808.
Reinisch, Widening the US Embargo Against Cuba Extraterritorially:
A Few Public International Law Comments on the 'Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 7 Eur. J. Int'l L. 545, 550
(1996).
48
Dr. Martin Gebauer, Kollisionrechtliche Auswirkungen der USamerikanischenHelms-Burton-Gesetzgebung,18 IPRax 145, 150 (1998); Meng,
supranote 2, at 427.
49 Ipsen, V6lkerrecht, § 23 Rn. 94; S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser.
A) No. 10, at 19.
50
Ipsen, V6kerrecht, § 26 Rn. 7; Shaw, supra note 45, at 452.
51 Browniie, supra note 45, at 298; Ipsen, V6lkerrecht, § 23 Rn. 93;
Organisation of American States: Inter-American Committee Opinion
Examining the U.S. Helms-Burton Act, 35 I.L.M. 1322, 1333 (1996).
47 August
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Also, applying this first observation to the Act and the liabilityprovision of Title 3 for non-U.S. nationals at the time of the
expropriation, such prohibiting rules would be infringed as observed
above.
Second, it is doubtful whether Titles 3 and 4 of the HelmsBurton Act fulfil the criteria of the classical approach for qualifying a
State that exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction. There are several
traditional starting points for justification: the territory, nationality,
security or protective aspects, and universality principles. 52 Other legal
commentators define the criteria with one requirement, the genuine link
requirement (see below)., 3 Both opinions are grounded in observations of
the practise of States and the first four appear to be concrete examples or
cases of the genuine link requirement.
The Genuine Link Requirement
As a general principle of international law, the so-called genuine
link is constituted when the governed circumstance occurring abroad is
substantially and sufficiently linked to an adequate circumstance
occurring within the territory of the governing State.54 The substantiality
and sufficiency of the genuine link is to be determined with the help of
criteria of international law, 5 which is why a closer look at the following
principles would be helpful.
The Territoriality Principle (Objective and Subjective)
As stated above, States may exercise jurisdiction full and
absolute on the State's territory. 6 Persons staying or events taking place
within a State's territory are as a rule subject to domestic law.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction would fall under that principle, when for
example the commencement of a crime is in one country (it would have
jurisdiction following the subjective territorialprinciple), and completed
in another, where the injury occurs. The latter would have jurisdiction
under the objective territorialprinciple.Since the "trafficking" of Title 3
of the Act is taking place entirely outside U.S. territory, neither of these
territoriality principles apply as justification here.
52 j.

G.

STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

243, 274-284

(Butterworths 7th ed. 1972).
" Ipsen, V6lkerrecht, § 23 Rn. 95.
54 Id.; Cf Nottebohm (Liech. V. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6); Cf. Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5).
55
Ipsen, V6lkerrecht, § 23 Rn. 95.
56 INGRID DETrER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

Doehring, V6lkerrecht, § 16 Rn. 808.

402 (Dartmouth 1994);
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The Nationality Principle
It is universally acknowledged that jurisdiction exercised
extraterritorially according to this principle is based on the nationality of
the person governed.5 7 Following this, the United States could impose
rules concerning the conduct of U.S. nationals abroad (instead of a
primary embargo against Cuba), but as for the conduct of non-nationals
abroadthe nationality principle would not qualify as a justification.
The Protective (Security) Principle
Jurisdiction based on this principle may be claimed in respect to
conduct (offences), which, even if committed abroad and by a nonnational, is regarded as a threat to the State's security.5 8 Trading with
Cuban products or investing in Cuba while building a hotel on formerly
confiscated property does not qualify as a threat to the U.S' security.
Universality Principle
According to the universality principle, jurisdiction can be
claimed regardless of the territorial and nationality connection, when the
offence is contrary to the interests of the international community. It is
applied in reference to criminal law, namely the crime of piracy and war
crimes s9 which is clearly not analogous to the trafficking of confiscated
property.
Effects Doctrine
Another starting point on a different level is expressed through
very
controversial, so-called effects doctrine, invoked when
the
regulating the conduct abroad of foreign nationals, because the conduct
has an economic impact in the regulating State.60 It can be applied "when
effect is substantial and the exercise of
the effect or the intended
61
jurisdiction is reasonable."
Title 3 of the Helms-Burton Act is-as cited in the Act itself 6 2 an example of exercising jurisdiction based on the effects doctrine. An
effect within United States territory could have been caused by the
expropriationwithout compensation; whether this is substantialremains
questionable. But even conceding this, the effect was caused by the
Wallace, supra note 45, at 103.
5"Schwarze, Die Jurisdiktionsabgrenzungim Volkerrecht 28.
59
Starke, supra note 52, at 212.
60
Wallace, supranote 45, at 102.
61 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402,
cmt. d, § 403, note 3 (1987), noted in Shaw, supra note 45, at 485.
62 Act § 301 (9).
57
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expropriation of the Cuban government, not by persons now being held
liable under the liabilityprovision.
As for the requirement of reasonableness, if Cuban sugar
originating from once confiscated land is traded in Europe by European
traders, how does the trade negatively influence the still existing claim of
a U.S. national for compensation for that confiscation? Surely this
tenuous connection does not meet the requirement of reasonableness.
Therefore, the liability provision is not justified by the effects doctrine
either.
ii. Title 3 of the Helms-Burton Act as a Reprisal
A reprisal is an illegal act committed by an injured State, which
will be justified if initiated as a counter-measure in retaliation to a
previous violation of international law by the offending State. 63
With some imagination, the Act could be seen as the U.S.'s
delayed reaction to the expropriations by the Cuban Government as well
as to the shoot-down of the two U.S. registered aircraft by the Cuban
military in February 1996.
But here again it must be emphasized that even provided both
acts are contrary to international law, they were conducted by the Cuban
government, not by the third party nationals, who are now held liable
under the Title 3 provision. The justification of a reprisal does not
include the violation of rights of third party States' nationals, 64 which
again precludes the liability provision from justification under the
reprisal principle. Because the requirements of a genuine link as well as
the basis for invoking the effects doctrine are not met, the "trafficking in
confiscated property by U.S. nationals" provision of Title 3 of the Act
does not fall within the limits of lawful extraterritorial jurisdiction, nor is
it justified as a reprisal. The United States presumed foreign jurisdiction
as their own, which constitutes a prohibited interference with internal
affairs of another State.65

iii. Title 4
The exclusion clause of Title 4 constitutes the proper exercise of
jurisdiction on territoriality principle grounds, and therefore must be
regarded as lawful.
63

Ipsen, V6lkerrecht, § 59 Rn. 45; Wallace, supra note 45, at 226.
V6lkerrecht, Rn. 1776.
64
65 Seidl-Hohenveldem,
lpsen, V6lkerrecht, § 23 Rn. 97.
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iv. Secondary Boycott
Since Title 3 of the Act is unlawful under international law, the
secondary boycott cannot be justified either. Again, the argument of the
danger of another wave of Cuban emigrants applying for asylum in the
United States and thus endangering the public order does not persuade.
On the contrary, foreign investment in Cuba is likely to create additional
employment and improve the general economic situation, which would
then be reflected in the lives of the Cuban people. Thus, the security
principle does not apply. The secondary boycott infringes the right of
another State to regulate whom their nationals are allowed to trade with,
thus constituting an unlawful interference with internal affairs and a
breach of General International Law.
Part 4-Conclusion
As shown above, Titles 3 and 4 of the Helms-Burton Act contain
serious violations of WTO law.
Title 3 of the Act, which provides a claim for now U.S. nationals
who were nationals of another State at the time of the expropriations,
infringes the sovereign right of that State to adjudicate under its domestic
or international law, and therefore constitutes a prohibited interference in
the internal affairs of another State.
Moreover, Title 3 constitutes an unlawfully extended exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect to the provision of a claim for U.S.
nationals at the time of the expropriations, and thus constitutes an
infringement of the States' sovereignty whose nationals are held liable.
Apart from those purely legal aspects, the Helms-Burton Act is
designed to indirectly force other States to comply with United States
foreign policy, which in this instance, differs from theirs. Indeed, the
worldwide protest against the Helms-Burton Act began as soon as plans
for its passage became public. The international community, by common
agreement, will not isolate Cuba. Nevertheless, foreign policy in respect
to trade with Cuba remains and should remain within the sovereign
discretion of each States. All States are equal and regardless of their
"power-potential" should be respected in their political decisions.

